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SOME CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
IMPACTS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT'
GEORGE JARVIS THOMPSON
The economic debacle of the past decade has made the man in the street
skeptical of the practical value of contract; he has been impressed by his
failure to get the promised advantage. To refer to the law of contract is
to invite a barrage of witticisms: "Isn't that a disappearing subject? Nobody
takes contracts seriously any more; a contract nowadays is good only as long
as both parties like it. Even the government has broken its promise on the
gold certificate, and look at what it has done to the gold clause bonds !"2
Naturally, this situation is disturbing to the thoughtful citizen, and he
begins to wonder if we are not really facing a disintegration of the very
fundamentals of contract-the morally binding force of one's promise. A
young law teacher recently remarked with misgiving that his first-year law
students reflected this attitude after nearly a year's study of contract. "I
asked them," said he, "how they could contemplate living in a world where
there was not even a moral sanction behind another's promise-no will to
keep one's word to the point of sacrifice." Nor were these same students
inclined to apply legal sanctions where in the turn of Fortune's wheel it
struck them as hard for the promisor to make good his promise in damages,
though the other party had completely and trustfully performed on his part.
Some may see reflected here three apparently unsettling influences: (1) the
breakdown of international law and respect for the validity of treaties be-
tween nations so common in our day; (2) the effect of the economic depres-
sion of the past decade; and (3) the lack of discipline, especially self-
discipline, regarded by not a few as one of the first fruits of the so-called
"progressive" education with its accentuation upon the child's having what
he wants when he wants it, unhampered by the old repressions of hard work
and sacrifice to make good his promise.3 Of course, these students exhibit
1The substance of this paper was embodied in an address by the author at the CORNELL
LAV QUARTERLY annual banquet, Ithaca, New York, April 13, 1940.2 See discussion of the gold clause cases, 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston
and Thompson 1938) §§ 1813, 1938; and Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood, 307 U. S.
247, 59 Sup. Ct. 847 (1939), approved (1939) 8 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 232, extending
the prohibition even to payment on a gold basis in alternative foreign currencies as
provided in the bond. And see infra note 33.3See Reeder, What Is Wrong with American Education Today? (1940) 51 SCHOOL &
SociETY 65; Small, In Defense of Progressivism: A Reply to Mr. Reeder (1940) 51
SCHOOL & SocIETY 733; Counts, Dare Progressive Education Be Progressive? in KIn-
PATRICK, SOURCE BOOK IN THE PHrLosopny OF EDUCATION (Rev. ed. 1934) 343; CoBB,
ONE FooT ON THE GROUND--A PLEA FOR CO7,I1nON SENSE IN EDUCATION (1932). And
see Elias, Liberalistic Education as the Cause of Fascism (1940) 51 ScHooL & SOCIETY
593; KILPATRICK, op. cit. supra, c. XVIII, Education and Life.
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the emotional reaction of the inexperienced. Making one's living soon awakens
an appreciation of both the individual and social interest in the timely and
full performance of promises, now frequently termed the "credit interest."
But even in the market place one finds articulate the demand for new deter-
minatives of what promises should be legally enforceable and the nature and
extent of the relief to be granted. To many, it seems that chaos lies ahead.
Does the situation justify such apprehension?
Just as nature meets the destructive challenge of disease by building up
within us the necessary antidote, so our Anglo-American law is already
providing needed correctives to buttress our economic and social foundations.
This takes the form of a broad jural paradox 4-on the one hand, not merely
does it forecast protection in general of the kinds of promises now enforced
but it is extending the number and flexibility of enforceable promises, while,
on the other hand, it turns to the opposite field of thrust law in order to
diminish both the need for and the number of enforceable promises.
I
Let us consider the first phase of this corrective paradox. Recent years
have witnessed renewed legislative attacks upon the creative function of the
seal in the making of contracts.5 For example, New York in a series of
amendments to Section 342 of the Civil Practice Act beginning in 1935 did
away with the operative effect of the seal in raising a presumption of con-
sideration which had been introduced by the Laws of 1828,6 and provided
that no longer should the seal have any effect upon the requirement of con-
sideration. Though this has been thought to have eliminated the sufficiency
of the seal as a substitute for consideration in creating enforceable contracts
in New York,7 and to that extent to have restricted the ease of contracting,
other provisions of this section as amended, doing away with the necessity
of a seal upon an agreement seeking to modify or vary a writing under seal,
4 CARDozo, THE PARADoxEs OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1928) 62 et seq.5See Comment, The Present Status of the Sealed Obligation (1939) 34 ILL. L. REv.
457; 1 WILLIST N, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1936) §§ 218, 219;
and Mr. Justice Goddard's special memorandum in the English Law Revision Com-
mittee's Sixth Interim Report, May 1937, p. 35, (1937) 15 CAN. B. REV. 618.
62 Rev. Stat. (1830) 406, § 77, amended by L. 1876, c. 448, L. 1877, c. 416, and L.
1920, c. 925. See Whiteside, Section 342 of the Civil Practice Act as Amended by
Chapter 708 of the Laws of 1935, REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES OF THE LAW
REViSOiN COimIssIoN (1936) 350; and additional amendments to this section, L. 1935,
c. 353, L. 1936, c. 685, L. 1937, c. 80.
7The late cases of Cochran v. Taylor, 273 N. Y. 172, 7 N. E. (2d) 89 (1937), and
Transbel Investment Co. v. Venetos, 279 N. Y. 207, 18 N. E. (2d) 129 (1938), recog-
nizing the ancient magic of the common-law seal in creating an enforceable obligation
without regard to consideration, have raised the question, may not this still be the law
of New York in spite of the recent amendments of Civil Practice Act § 342? A study
is now bding made on this point by the New York State Law Revision Commission.
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and extending the doctrine of undisclosed principal to sealed instruments,
operated in just the opposite direction to increase the number and scope of
enforceable contracts. Some recent writers have regretted the passing of
the sealed contract and favor as a substitute the Uniform Written Obligdtions
Act recommended by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1925.
This Act provides that a written release or promise signed by the person
releasing or promising shall be enforceable without regard to consideration
if it also contains an additional express statement in any form of language
that the signer intends to be legally bound.8  On the other hand, a new
tendency to restrict the Statute of Limitations on sealed instruments to the
same period as on simple written contracts,9 and elimination of specially
burdensome consequences, such as the equal formality rule for modification
or discharge, the special rules of evidence' 0 and the rule against application
of the undisclosed principal doctrine, may well lead to statutory revival of
the common-law function of the seal to create enforceable obligations without
consideration."' In support of this suggestion it may be observed that the
Uniform Act in its fifteen years of life has been adopted in but two states,
neither of which needed it since both had and still retain the common-law seal.
12
A more disturbing factor has been the recent hue and cry against the
orthodox common-law requisite of consideration in the formation of contracts.
8Reeve, The Uniform Written Obligations Act (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 580
[SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1931) 6143; Sharp, Promissory
Liability (1939-40) 7 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 1, 250, 251; note, Contracts without Considera-
tion: The Seal and the Uniform Written Obligations Act (1936) 3 U. OF CHI. L. Rxv.
312; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1936) § 219A; 6 id.
at § 1822.
3E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-IHurd, 1934) c. 83, § 17, making the period ten years
on all such written instruments; N. Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 47a (added by L. 1938, c. 499),
limiting actions on bonds and/or mortgages secured by real property to six years, the
same as on simple contracts, whether oral or written.
'OE.g., the rule prohibiting denial of a recital of consideration in a sealed instrument.
It is not clear that this effect has been achieved by the amendments of 1935-37 to the
N. Y. Civil Practice Act § 342, especially as to sealed options. See note (1939) 8 FORD.
L. REv. 414.
"I1t was these unusual and burdensome consequences attached to the seal as comparea
with ordinary written contractual obligations which led to the widespread revolt against
the common-law seal. See Steele. The Uniform Written Obligations Act-A Criticism
(1926) 21 ILL. L. REV. 185 [SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1931)
608]. £he writer has been fortified in this suggestion by the fact that since it was
penned, his colleague, Professor John W. MacDonald, ExeiFutive Secretary and Director
of Research of the New York State Law Revision Commission, announced in addressing
the Lawyers' Institute held at Cornell Law School, August 1940, that his research staff
in making a study of the effect of the decision in Transbel Investment Co. v. Venetos,
supra note 7, had come to a similar conclusion because of the simplicity and convenience
of the seal. See 1 WILSTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1936) § 219;
Sharp, supra note 8, at 251.
1 2PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 33, § 6 (P. L. 1927, 958); Burns' Contested
Election, 315 Pa. 23, 171 Atl. 888 (1934); Utah Laws 1929, c. 62, omitted from Utah
Stat. 1933, though apparently still law. And see note (1936) 3 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 312.
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No less an authority than Lord Wright,13 President of the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council of the British Empire, influenced by his experience
there in administering world-wide law, advocates the abandonment of our
concept of a bargained-for consideration for the most advanced of Civilian
views, the Roman-Dutch Law of South Africa, to wit, that every promise de-
liberately made and indicating an intention to enter into a lawful agreement
be enforced. Indeed, it may be news to many that in 1937 a statute forth-
- with abolishing the doctrine of consideration passed the New York legislature.
This drastic legislation was vetoed by Governor Lehman only upon urgent
representations from bench, bar, and business organizations that the great
commercial fabric of the Empire State was unprepared for so radical a change
without opportunity for study and discussion.' 4 Needless to add, the New
York State Law Revision Commission was no party to this premature move,
for it functions to provide just such preliminary investigation. But suppose
this extreme suggestion does become law. What will it mean? Simply an
extension of legal enforcement to more promises, that is, making more con-
tracts rather than less-it is to be hoped to the consequent strengthening
of the credit interest.
Mention of the New York State Law Revision Commission reminds that
it, too, by its recommended legislation has been whittling down the require-
ment of consideration. 15 With what result? Again increasing the number
and types of enforceable promises. These are limited chiefly to those promises
modifying or discharging existing contracts. Substituted for consideration is
13Wright, Oujtht the Doctrine of Consideration to Be Abolished from the Commo 1
Law? (1936) 49 H~Auv. L. Rzv. 1225, 1234, 1252. Similar, suggestions had already been
made in America. See Ballentine, Is the Doctrine of Consideration Senseless and
Illogical? (1913) 11 MICH. L. REv. 423 [SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
(1931) 5881; and Llewellyn, Contract, 4 ENcYc. Soc. Scr. (1931) 337.
141937 Senate Introd., No. 2089, Print No. S. 2623, Senator Kleinfeld. Passed May 7;
vetoed without memorandum May 26, 1937. The English Law Revision Committee,
Sixth Interim Report, May 1937, p. 17, par. 27, (1937) 15 CAN. B. REv. 600, rejected
the suggested summary abolition of the requirement of consideration for similar reasons,
but proceeded to recommend a radical pruning of the doctrine. The various recommenda-
tions contained in this report of the English Law Revision Committee, though submitted
to Parliament, have not yet been adopted.
'
5 See N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 342, as amended 1935, 1936; N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW
§ 33 (2), N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 279, as amended 1934, 1936, 1937; N. Y. DEBTOR
AND CREDITOR LAW § 243, added 1936. This legislative program was based on studies
prepared for the Commission by Professor H. E. Whiteside, The Development of the
Doctrine of Consideration, REPORT, RECOmMENDATIONS AND STUDIES OF THE LAW R vi-
SION CozfmiSsION (1936) 81 et seq., and Professor A. Arthur Schiller, The Counterpart
of Consideration in Foreign Legal Systems, id. at 183 et seq., and related studies on
Doctrines Relating to the Seal and a Promise to Perform or the Performance of a
Pre-existing Duty as Consideration, made by research staff members of the Commission
under the direction of Prcfessor John W. MacDonald. Compare the English Law
Revision Committee's Sixth Interim Report, May 1937. (1937) 15 CAN. B. REv. 585,
recommending even more drastic inroads upon the doctrine of consideration.
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the safeguard that the new promise be in writing 6 and signed by the party
against whom it is sought to be enforced. This development is in direct
answer to the impact of the continuing business depression of the past decade
and is to be applauded for giving legal flexibility to economic adjustments of
contracts which both parties recognize as having become a harsh burden to
the obligor through no fault of his own. 17 Indeed, the moral and practical
appeal of this situation had earlier led several courts, without the aid of
statute, to qualify the orthodox common-law rule denying enforcement of
such promises for want of consideration in certain cases and to give effect
to the promise so far as it had been performed, particularly with respect to
agreements for reduction of rent below that called for in a lease.' s Note,
'GLlewellyn, Contract, 4 ENcYc. Soc. ScI. (1931) 337, suggests such writing as a
practicable substitute for the consideration requisite in general. Accord, English Law
Revision Committee's second recommendation [Sixth Interim Report, May 1937, p. 31,
(1937) 15 CAN. B. REv. 615]: "That an agreement shall be enforceable if the promise or
offer has been made in writing by the promisor or his agent, or if it be supported by
valuable consideration past or present."
For other statutes giving effect to written receipt or agreement to accept part pay-
ment in full, see 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1936)
§ 120, note 9.17This objective has been aided by the 1937 amendments, recommended by the New
York State Law Revision Commission, adding to N. Y. Personal Property Law §§ 33-a and
33-b, and N. Y. Real Property Law §§ 280 and 281, which give effect to an executory ac-
cord provided it is in writing and signed by the party against whom it is sought to be
enforced, and also make operative tender of the performance requested by a written and
signed offer of accord though the tender is rejected by the offeror.
Similar revision has been recommended by the English Law Revision Committee [Sixth
Interim Report, May 1937, p. 31, (1937) 15 CAN. B. Rav. 6151:
"(3) That an agreement to accept a lesser sum in discharge of an enforceable obli-
gation to pay a larger sum shall be deemed to have been made for valuable consideration,
but if the new agreement is not performed then the original obligation shall revive.
"(4) That an agreement in which one party makes a promise in consideration'of the
other party doing or promising to do something which he is already bound to do by
law, or by a contract made either with the other party or with a third party, shall be
deemed to have been made for valuable consideration."
Cf. Heilman, The Correlation between the Sciences of Law and Econmlcs (1932) 20
CALI. L. REv. 379.
I8Schuessler v. Lundstrom, 246 Fed. 439, 158 C. C. A. 503 (1917) ; McKenzie v. Har-
rison, 120 N. Y. 260, 24 N. E. 458 (1890). See Whiteside, Study in Relation to the
Seal and Consideration, REPORT, RECOMENDATIONS AND STUDIES OF THE LAW RviSioN
CommissioN (1936) 259; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson
1936) § 120, note 4. Quaere, would these courts enforce a tenant's promise, made in
course of the term, to pay an increased rent thereafter though no new consideration
was given him therefor? Denied in Torrey v. Adams, 254 Mass. 22, 149 N. E. 618
(1925), 43 A. L. R. 1447, 1451 (1926). An analogous qualification was also applied in
some states to parol modification of a sealed contract, e.g., Cammack v. J. B. Slattery
& Bro., Inc., Z41 N. Y. 39, 148 N. E. 781 (1925), while recent years have witnessed
judicial enforcement of ultra vires contracts of corporations to the extent Derformed if
not repugnant to public policy. See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and
Thompson 1936) § 271. Some courts went farther and enforced the promised reduction
even as to future rent due under the lease. Lindeke Land Co. v. Kalman, 190 Minn.
601. 252 N. W. 650, 93 A. L. R. 1393, 1404 (1934) (purporting to find consideration
in the tenant continuing in possession of the leased premises in the absence of such a
[Vol. 26
IMPACTS IN LAW OF CONTRACT
however, that these modifying promises are still in harmony with the voli-
tional background of our contract law, merely requiring that the creditor
make good his voluntary promise in keeping with his moral duty. No Hamlet's
choice is afforded the debtor-to keep or not to keep his original contract ;19
only the creditor's promise of relief can aid him.
And what of the current insistence upon recognition of the "reliance in-
terest" in the law of contract? Its advocates sometimes concede need of safe-
guards and tend to present their suggestions in the guise of simple steps-
either speaking to the reliance interest in contract damages as a special
measure of liability,20 or, going further, presenting it as a principle of prom-
issory liability though still usually carrying its special measure of damages.2 '
The Contracts Restatement of the American Law Institute is condemned for
not recognizing the reliance interest either in contract damages or, more
broadly, as equivalent to consideration. 22 It should not be overlooked, how-
ever, that the Restatement does give much effect to the reliance theory in
famous Section 90, restating promissory estoppel.2 This section would make
enforceable a promise where the promisor should have expected that the
promisee would rely on the promise in a definite and substantial manner and
he has so relied to his damage, but then only if there is no other way to do
justice. The trouble with that, say these critics, is twofold: first, it operates
chiefly outside the bilateral contract field in which lies our socially essential
credit interest and, therefore, will enforce some non-essential promises; and,
second, it applies in all cases the ordinary contractual measure of damages,
that is, the value of the promised performance, frequently termed "the ex-
pectancy interest." 24
requirement in the lease), approved (1934) 32 MIcH. L. REV. 1001, as peculiarly a
depression problem. But the orthodox view was adhered to in Levine v. Blumenthal,
117 N. J. L. 23, 186 Atl. 457 (Sup. Ct. 1936), aff'd 117 N. J. L. 426, 189 Atl. 54 (1937),
both as to past and as to future rent.
19 Mr. Justice Holmes' view [The Path of the Law (1897) 10 HARv. L. Rxv. 457, 462]
that there is such a legal choice as distinguished from the de facto power to break a
contract has been repudiated in a recent English case, Ahmed Angullia v. Estate &
Trust Agencies, Ltd., [1938] A. C. 624, approved (1939) 55 L. Q. Rxv. 1. See to the
same effect, Barbour, The "Right" to Break a Contract (1917) 16 MIcir. L. REv. 106
[SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1931) 500]; Sharp, supra note 8,
at 252; 1 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (1836) 25.20Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (1936-37) 46 YALE
L. J. 52, 373. Cf. Cohen, The Basis of Contract (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 553, 578-580.2 1Sharp, loc. cit. supra note 8 _Mason, A Theory of Contract Sanctions (1938) 38
CoL. L. REv. 775, 777, 784, note 22; Shattuck, Gratuitous Promises-A New Writ?(1937) 35 Micia. L. REv. 908.22Fuller and Perdue, supra note 20, at 89; Shattuck, sujra note 21, at 941, 944n.
231 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson, 1936) § 139.
24Fuller and Perdue, mpra note 20, at 64-65, 80, 88 et seq.; Shattuck, supra note 21,
at 909, 941 et seq.; Gardner, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Law of Contracts(1932) 46 HARV. L. REV. 1, 23; and POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW (1925) 236.
This criticism is at least equally apt with respect to the eighth recommendation of
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They want the "reliance interest" recognized as at least supplemental to
the "bargain interest" of present-day consideration for the purpose of creating
promissory liability. Then, particularly if the case falls outside the general
"credit interest" field, damages are to be measured, subject to the court's
discretion, not, as normally, by the value of the promised performance, but
by the extent to which the promisee has been damaged in his reliance on the
promise.
There is much to be said for this view as a supplemental basis25 for
expansion of the contract concept, since it has both historic support and
intrinsic merit. It harks back to the very beginnings of the action of case
sur assumpsit as an ex delicto remedy for deceit, practically coincident with
the discovery of America, as Dean Ames has shown in his classic articles
on the history of assumpsit.26 This ex delicto writ of case lay, it will be
remembered, only where there was damage, which here consisted of a detri-
ment suffered by the promisee in justifiable reliance on the promise. The
transition of assumpsit from a tort action to a contract action may be com-
pared to the marriage of the little red-trousered Chinese bride of old, her
identity becoming merged into the new family, which youthful Assumpsit
experienced when the measure of damages for the broken promise changed
from the value of what the promisee had parted with or the damage he had
suffered in reliance on the promise27 to the value of the promised or return
performance, i.e., the measure of recovery applied in the other ex contractu
actions of covenant and debt. This became settled shortly after famous
Slad's Case, 1602,28 which introduced indebitatus assumpsit, based upon the
the'English Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report, May 1937, p. 31, (1937) 15
CAN. B. REv. 616: "That a promise which the promisor knows, or reasonably should
know, will be relied on by the promisee shall be enforceable if the promisee has altered his
.position to his detriment in reliance on the promise."2 5That it should but serve to supplement other accepted bases for enforcement of
promises, see Cohen, supra, note 20, at 578, 585; Sharp, supra note 8, at 19 et seg.;
POUND, AN INTRODUCTiON To THE PHILOSOPHY or LAW (1925) 261, 275, 276.2 6Ames, History of Assumpsit (1888) 2 HARv. L. REv. 1, 53; AMES, LEcTURES ON
LEGAL HISTORY (1913) Lectures XIII, XIV. ESELEcTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS (1931) 33; 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AmERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (1909)
259]; and see Gardner, supra note 19, at 22. Cf. Washington, Damages int Contract at
Common Law (1931) 47 L. Q. Rv. 345, 372.27That the measure of damages in the early ex delicto phase of assumpsit was not
limited to the value of the consideration given for the promise but, as generally in the
action on the case, included consequential damages, see Washington, supra note 26, at
372-376; Shattuck, supra note 21, at 908-912. Cf. Mason, supra note 21, at 777.
284 Coke, 92b (K. B. 1603).
Ames and Holdsworth agree that the transition was effected as a logical consequence
of Slade's Case as expressly stated in Pinchon's Case, 9 Coke, 86b, 88b-89a (1612),
recognizing that assumpsit lay against executors to enforce debts of their testator and
that in spite of the ex delicto origin of that writ the maxim actio personalis inontur
cur persona did not apply because ". . . an action sur Assumpsit upon good considera-
tion, without specialty, to do a thing is no more personal, i.e. annexed to the person,
[Vol. 26
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implied-in-fact promise arising from the creation of a debt situation, and
it has remained the common-law measure of damages in contract to this day.20
Though, of course, aware of this, the reliance advocates object to the realistic
description, "the revival of the tort theory of recovery in contract." They
would ignore the ancient procedural distinctions and argue now that the old
forms of action have been abolished and a single, simple statement of the
cause of action substituted, not only in most of our states but even in the
homeland of our law, the question should be considered on the merits of its
moral and practical desirability. In short, should these promises be enforced?
Would it be advantageous to introduce this intermediate measure of relief-
injurious reliance damages? If so, say they, let the innovation be accepted
as a normal evolution of the law of contract into the broader concept of the
law of obligations3 0
In spite of the plausible appeal of the reliance interest argument, we should
not be stampeded by the idea that we must rush in to fill an aching void
in our law of contract. Obviously, many promises now refused recognition
as contracts are already indirectly enforced by the quasi-contractual doctrine
of restitution to the same extent that they would be under the reliance interest
theory.31 To appreciate that this is no mean portion of our law, one needs
but look at the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Resti-
tution. Recognition of the reliance interest may point the way of progress,
however, in meeting the present-day challenge. If adopted, it will broaden
direct liability on promises.
Concurrently with this expansion of the contract concept has come an
expanding of the remedy of specific performance for breach of contract, thus
further enhancing the practical utility of contract by assuring the promisee
that he will get the performance promised. This but repeats the experience
of the older Civil Law of Europe: an extraordinary remedy becomes the
than a covenant by specialty to do the same thing." This was extended to simple con-
tracts of a testator in Sanders v. Esterby, Cro. Jac. 417 (1616). See Ames, supra note
26, at 15 [SEEcTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONRACTS (1931) 45; and 3 SELECT
ESSAYS IN ANGLo-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (1909) at 276]; 3 HOLDSWORTHE, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1923) 451, 452. But a later writer has found several cases
recognizing the value of the promise as the measure of damages in assumpsit in the last
two decades of the sixteenth century and culminating in Slade's Case. Washington,
supra note 26, at 373 et seq.
29See Holmes, J., in Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. McCaull-Dinsmore Co., 253 U. S.
97, 100, 40 Sup. Ct. 504 (1920); Shattuck, supra note 21, at 908-912; McCoRmIcK,
DAMAGES (1935) 561; POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHLOSOPHY OF LAW (1925)
236; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1937) §§ 1338-1339A.30Cohen, supra note 20, at 578; Fuller and Perdue, supra note 20, at 405; Mason,
supra note 21, at 776; Shattuck, supra note 21, at 941 et seq.; McCoRmICx, DAMAFS
(1935) 454. And see Washington, supra note 26, at 366. Cf. Gardner, supra note 24,
at 22.3ISee Fuller and Perdue, supra note 20, at 374; Sharp, supra note 8, at 17 et seq.
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usual remedy. Of course, there is still far to go in this direction, but definite
progress is being made toward that desirable goal.3 2
II
Now to turn to the reverse of the corrective paradox-the diminution of
the promissory element in contrast with its extension. A recent best-seller88
magnifies the golden thread of credit-the honorable record of performance
of business promises-to the point where it obscures the related economic
and legal aspects of the social fabric. It is well to emphasize in the interest
of social stabilization the enduring values of promises habitually honored,
but these commentators completely overlook another and increasingly impor-
tant source of legally enforceable obligation-the relational or thrust-law
obligation.34 Historically, this thrust type of obligation far antedates the
evolution of the action of assumpsit, for it represents the characteristic pre-
Columbian obligation of ancient England. 35 Product of the static society of
that day, it applied to those who became parties to the routine domestic and
business relations of the community life and is readily recognized by the dual
title indicating the respective parties to the particular relation, as, for example,
husband and wife, master and servant, principal and agent, and shipper and
common carrier.36 These relations may be created without benefit of promise,
32Sharp, supra note 8, at 22 et seq.; Walsh, The Growing Function of Equity in the
Development of the Law in 3 LAw--A CENTURY OF PRoGREss (1937) 139, 174; WALSH,
EQUITY (1930) 300. An impetus has also been given this movement by legislation, viz.,
Uniform Sales Act § 68 [see 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thomp-
son 1937) § 1419A]; and modern procedural codes, practice acts and rules of court (e.g.,
Federal Rules of Practice, Rule 2) are gradually making equitable relief available under
one general type of procedure whenever appropriate.
In some degree this seems to be a retracing of our legal history, for Professor Bar-
bour, The History of Contract in Early English Equity in 4 OxFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAl,
AND LEGAL HISTORY (1914), points out that in the fifteenth century the chancellor exer-
cised a wide discretion in enforcing agreements not under seal, that is, simple promises
before they were recognized and enforced at law. See Coox, CASES ON EQuITY (2d ed.
1932) 509.3 3 SCHERMAx, THE PROMISES MEN LIVE BY (1938). In spite of extravagant praise
from the prominent persons featured on the dust jacket, including Bernard M. Bartich
and William Allen White, the book tells at most but half the story. This book contains
a scathing historical resum6 of government promises.3 4 PoUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COmMON LAW (1921) 20 et seq. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW
(Pollock ed. 1906) 320, calls this "Imperative Law."35
"The law of contract holds anything but a conspicuous place among the institutions
of English law before the Norman conquest. In fact it is rudimentary. Many centuries
must pass away before it wins that dominance which we at the present day concede to it.
Even in the schemes of Hale and Blackstone it appears as a mere supplement to the law
of property." 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1899)
184. See infra note 40.3 6 Cohen, srupra note 20, at 554; Thompson, The Relation of Common Carrier of Goods
and Shipper, and Its Incidents of Liability (1924) 38 HARV. L. REv. 28; POUND, THE
SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW (1921) 20 et seq.; POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL
HISTORY (1923) 57.
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the law thrusting the reciprocal rights and duties upon the parties irrespective
of their knowledge of or assent to the specific terms, for this is the non-
volitional obligation of status.
A century ago the foregoing view emphasizing the paramount significance
of the promise would have been correct, for that was the heyday of the voli-
tional contract as the primary source of legal obligations. An ever-expanding
frontier providing new lands and new opportunities in the New World
economically unshackled the millions of Western Europe, and engendered in
our own land the spirit of free enterprise and rugged individualism. The
free-will philosophy of Kant and Rousseau dominated both the law and the
dynamic society of that day.3 7 Well-founded seemed to be Sir Henry Maine's
famous epigram of the mid-century-that the movement of progressive
societies had been from status to contract 38 Implied contract carried a heavy
load in the nineteenth-century attempt to compress most legal obligations into
the contract mould.3 9 The survival of the common-law relational obligations
was obscured by the historical accident that the plaintiff suing for breach
of a relational duty had the alternative of resorting to the ex contractu action
of assumpsit or to an ex delicto action on the case, and, of course, in this
period the ex contractu remedy had an overshadowing supremacy.
With the disappearance of our public lands about 1910, the Westward-Ho
movement of three centuries abruptly ended; then began an almost geometri-
cally accelerated return to the static society of the pre-Columbian period
which gave a new emphasis and significance to the relational thrust-law obli-
gation springing from that earlier day.40 Even before the turn of the century
3 7RoussEAU, SOcIAL. CONTRACT (Tozer transl. 3d ed. 1905) c. VI. See Cohen, supra
note 20, at 575; POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY (1923) 54 et seq.; PouND,
CONTEMPORARY JURISTIC THEORY-I. THE REVIVAL OF ABSOLUTISM (1940) 4.
38MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (Pollock ed. 1906) 174. See POUND, THE SPRT OF THE
CoMMox LAW (1921) 34; POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY (1923) 53.3 9 PARSONS ON CONTRACTS (1st ed. 1853) 3 et seq., quoting 2 BLACKSTONE, CoM-
MENTARIES 443; Pound, The Economic Interpretation and the Law of Torts (1940) 53
HARV. L. REV. 365, 382. The ancient origin of the social contract theory and its practical
value in rationalizing a legal responsibility of the sovereign toward his subject is dis-
cussed by Cohen, supra note 20, at 591. See also Laski, The Social Contract, 14 ENCYC.
Soc. SCL (1934) 127; Cohen, A Critical Sketch of Legal Philosophy in America in 2
LAW-A CENTURY OF PROGRESS (1937) 266, 275 et seq.; 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAIE.
160.40Cheadle, Government Control of Business, II (1920) 20 COL. L. REv. 550, 554;
Pound, The New Feudalism (1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 553, 557. Cf. 2 POLLOCK AND MAnt-
LAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1899) 233, which, relying on MAINE, ANCIENT
LAW (6th ed.) 170, 305, [(Pollock ed. 1906) 173, 3731 points out that though the law of
contract was a comparatively late growth, the really feudal centuries were "the golden
days of 'free,' if 'formal,' contract." A reading of the passages referred to in Maine dis-
closes a rationalization of the relation of lord and man analogous to Rousseau's social
compact theory of the relation of sovereign and subject, or state and citizen, which, by
the way, Maine severely criticizes [ANCIENT LAW (Pollock ed. 1906) 323]. The freedom
of contract mentioned was the freedom of a man to contract away not only his own
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this change was foreshadowed by the movement for statutory or administra-
tive standardization of the terms of certain types of contracts,41 such as in-
surance policies, public building contracts and surety bonds, employment con-
tracts, et cetera. In the law of public utilities, too, appeared early manifesta-
tions of the coming era. The epidemic of comprehensive public utility statutes
beginning about 1905, and creating public service commissions with state-wide
powers to regulate the reciprocal rights and duties in the generic relation of
public utility proprietor and patron, speeded the diminishing importance of
the promise in this field. Even before the advent of the New Deal, federal
bureaucracy was well on its all-absorbing way from the Interstate Commerce
Commission of 1887 through the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal
Power Commission, the Federal Radio Commission on down to the Home
Owners Loan Corporation, to mention but a few. The New Deal, though
coming to power on an anti-bureaucracy platform,42 quickly turned and capi-
talized upon this trend, as witness not only the abortive National Industrial
Recovery Act but also the Federal Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Federal Communications Commission, the Bituminous Coal Commission, the
Civil Aeronautics Authority, and both federal and state regulation by big and
little labor relations boards, wage standards boards, social security adminis-
trations and other alphabetical administrative bodies too numerous to men-.
tion.43 Only the relational approach will adequately explain and support this
general system of imposed obligations--"there," says the law to the employer,
"swallow that and like it, any contracts you may have made or may make
to the contrary notwithstanding." Quaere, will it come to speak as peremp-
torily to labor? Taxation, too, takes its fling at the hapless promise, for,
freedom but that of his descendants. This would be more accurately described as the
power to enter into the relation of lord and man.4ICohen, supra note 20, at 588; Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts (1917) 27 YALE
L. J. 34; and particularly Professor K. N. Llewellyn's constructive critique of this
development in his review E (1939) 52 HARv. L. REv. 700] of PRAUSNiTZ, THE STAN-
DARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACIS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW (1937).42Campaign address on the Federal Budget at Pittsburgh, Pa., Oct. 19, 1932, I PUBLIC
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOsEvELT (1938) Item 144, pp. 808 et seq., in sup-
port of the Democratic platform of 1932 calling for "an immediate and drastic reduction of
governmental expenditures by abolishing useless commissions and offices, consolidating
departments and bureaus, and eliminating extravagance, to accomplish a saving of not
less than 25 per cent in the cost of Federal Government." See President- Roosevelt's
explanatory note to said address, id. at 811. Pursuant to power conferred by the Federal
Reorganization Act of 1939 (53 STAT. 561, 5 U. S. C. A. §§ 133b et seq.), the Bituminous
Coal Commission was abolished and its functions were transferred to the Department
of the Interior, and the Civil Aeronautics Authority was transferred to the Department
of Commerce.4 3LINDLEY, HALF WAY WITH ROOSEVELT (1936) 151 et seq.; HACKER, A SHORT HIs-
TORY OF THE NEW DEAL (1935). And see in general, LYON AND ABRAMSON, GOVERN-
MENT AND ECONOMIC LI=E, 2 vols., Brookings Institute Publications No. 79 (1939) and
No. 83 (1940).
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as a recent discerning writer has pointed out, "Men now do things by virtue
of their status as citizens and taxpayers which formerly they did by voluntary
agreement. One only needs to mention the fields of charity and education
to make this obvious." 44
Backgrounded against the vista of our common-law history, this adminis-
trative evolution appears in broad outlines as a logical resultant of the
economic and social forces which dominate this first half of the twentieth
century. The World War of 1914-18 brought on the world-wide economic
depression which overwhelmed the United States a decade ago. Big men as
well as little men everywhere turned to their governments for relief4 5-that
spelled government-imposed adjustments: thrust rights to one, thrust obli-
gations upon another-a dangerous power easily translated into "might makes
right" and the absolute regimentation of dictatorship. What more natural
than that we should find paralleled in our law of contract those elemental
forces of freedom and regulation which contend so mightily for supremacy in
the political world around us !46 Today the broad jural paradox described
serves to harness these divergent forces so that they unite to undergird our
delicately balanced social order. But what of tomorrow? The experience of
the centuries bids us have faith in our common-law heritage.47
4 4Cohen, supra note 20, at 554; 1 LYON AND A3RAMSON, GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC
LIFE (1939) 486 et seq.45Cohen, mipra note 20, at 565; Dickinson, Political Aspects of the New Deal (1934)
28 Am. POL. ScI. REv. 197, 200.4 6POUND, CONTEMPORARY JURISTIC THEORY-I. THE REVIVAL OF ABSOLUTISMi (1940).4 7Faith in the resiliency and enduring vitality of our common law to meet successfully
today's world crisis is voiced in Aronson, Mr. Justice Stone and the Spirit of the Con-
mon Law (1940) 25 CORNELL L. Q. 489.
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